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THE LEGAL STATUS OF JOINT VENTURE CORPORATIONS
THOMAS F. BRODEN*
ALFRED L. SCANLAN**
INTRODUCTION
American industry employs many forms of business organizations.
The sole proprietorship, the partnership, general and limited, the
joint venture, the joint stock company, the corporation, public issue
and close, and many others are all familiar and well established in
their use. This article deals with the use by American industry of the
close corporation to carry on a joint venture. With due deference to
purists in legal terminology we have elected to refer to this particular
type of corporate entity as the joint venture corporation. In this arti-
cle we not only look at the use made of the joint venture corporation
in America but also we examine its treatment at the hands of Ameri-
can courts.
ABERCROMBIE v. DAVIES
The recent case of Abercrombie v. Davies,1 was not an encouraging
one for those who value the joint venture corporation as a useful
form of business organization available to American businessmen.
In that case, the Supreme Court of Delaware had before it a joint
venture corporation formed in 1947 to carry on foreign oil operations.
A few years after operations commenced some of the participants
joined together in a stock pooling agreement. Some time later, other
participants in the joint venture who were not parties to the stock
pooling agreement challenged its validity. In the instant case, the
Supreme Court of Delaware struck the agreement down on the
grounds that it failed to meet certain formal requirements of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law. While the result of the case may not
be particularly disturbing, the opinion of the court is somewhat dis-
quieting because of its total lack of recognition that the case involved
a special kind of corporation. In addition, unfortunately, there was
no acknowledgment by the court that, for certain purposes, joint ven-
ture corporations of the kind before the court have been treated by
the law differently than other corporations.
The joint venture corporation in the case, American Independent
Oil Company (American), was formed to obtain and develop an oil
concession in the Kuwait-Saudia Arabian neutral zones. It was under-
* Associate Professor of Law, Law School, Notre Dame University.
** Member of the District of Columbia, Maryland and Indiana bars. Asso-
ciated in the law firm of Shea, Greenman, Gardner & McConnaughey, Wash-
ington, D. C. and New York City.
1. 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957), 11 VAN. L. REV. 215 (1957).
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stood that the ruler of Kuwait, the British Foreign Office, and the
United States Department of State preferred that the concession go to
an independent organization rather than to a major oil company. To
secure the necessary approval of these governmental bodies, it was
agreed that no single interest would dominate American. Accordingly,
each of the participants had a voice in its operation and was repre-
sented by at least one director on the board of the joint venture
corporation. The major investor-participant, Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany, was represented by four directors, three other investors by two
directors, and the remaining participants were represented by one
director each. Oil was discovered and the company prospered.
Three years after American began operations enough of the smaller
participants to constitute a majority on the board of directors entered
into the agreement in question. The alleged purpose was to prevent
Phillips from obtaining control of American. In substance, the agree-
ment bound the parties for ten years to vote on corporation matters
as seven of the eight directors representing them desired. If concur-
rence of seven on any matter was not attained a system of arbitration
was set up to determine how all should vote. In form the agreement
provided a transfer of voting control of the stock of the parties to
eight agents for a period of ten years. The agents were to be identical
as far as possible with the directors.
The court held the agreement to be a voting trust and since appli-
cable statutory requirements as to filing and exchange of stock certifi-
cates had not been met, it was held to be invalid. We are not here con-
cerned with the result of the case. It may be that the voting trust
provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law were intended
to cover agreements involving participants in a joint venture corpora-
tion if such agreements otherwise fall within the registration require-
ment of Delaware law. However, it is unfortunate that the court
reached its conclusion on this issue without so much as alluding to
the fact that American Independent was a close corporation of a
special type. To the extent that Delaware precedents in the law of
corporations have a wider impact on the use of the corporate form
titan those of any other American jurisdiction, its omission is doubly
r- grettable.
THE JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION IS A UNIQUE ENTITY
The distinction between close and public issue corporations has long
been recognized. The close corporation is an enterprise in corporate
form "in which management and ownership are substantially identical.
As a result of that identity the participants consider themselves 'part-
ners' and seek to conduct the corporate affairs to a greater or lesser
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extent in the manner of a partnership. '2 The usual characteristics of
a close corporation are that: (a) the stockholders are few in number;
(b) they know one another reasonably well; (c) most of them take
an active part in the enterprise; (d) each assumes some definite obliga-
tion with respect to the conduct of the enterprise; and (e) the identity
of the other stockholders is important to them.3
The joint venture corporation is merely the traditional joint venture
arrangement cast in corporate form. The orthodox joint venture is a
legal relation of comparatively recent origin but one which has been
recognized by the American courts.4 It is usually described "as an
association of persons to carry out a single business enterprise for
profit."5 The joint venture has all the attributes of a partnership.6
While the usual joint venture generally is limited to a single trans-
action,7 nevertheless, the business of conducting the joint venture may,
if the character of enterprise is a continuing one, carry on for a number
of years.8 A corporation, of course, is a legal entity distinct from its
stockholders and does not in itself constitute a joint venture relation.9
However, in the absence of some prohibiting provision, either in the
statute or the corporate charter, a corporation may enter into a bind-
ing agreement to carry on a joint venture with another if the purposes
of the venture are within the corporate powers bestowed.10 There is
no doubt, according to a leading commentator on corporate law, that a
corporation has the capacity "to enter into a commercial venture
within the general scope of its corporate powers, whereby the profits
or losses of the enterprise are to be divided between the corporation
and another person or corporation."'"
Therefore, at least from an analytical point of view, there would
appear to be no legal barriers prohibiting a corporation from entering
into an agreement with others, including other corporations, to create
a joint venture to carry on an enterprise within the corporate powers
bestowed on the corporation. Oklahoma, for example, has consistently
2. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948).
3. Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q.
313,314 (1943).
4. Porter v. Cooke, 127 F.2d 853, 857-58 (5th Cir. 1942).
5. 48 C.J.S., Joint Adventures § 1 (1947); Pan American Trade & Invest.
Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 33 Del. Ch. 425, 94 A.2d 700, 702 (Ch. 1953).
6. Southwestern Lumber Co. v. Kerr, 11 F. Supp. 253, 263 (S.D. Tex. 1934),
aff'd, 78 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 611 (1935).
7. 48 C.J.S., Joint Adventures § 1 (1947).
8. Morris v. Lessel, 185 Ark. 18, 45 S.W.2d 524 (1932); Upper Penns Neck
Township v. Lower Penns Neck Township, 20 N.J. Super. 280, 89 A.2d 727,
732 (L. 1952).
9. Buck v. G. W. L. Constr. Co., 114 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
10. Kasishke v. Baker, 146 F.2d 113 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 856(1945).
11. 6 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIONS § 2520 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1950);
Red Robin Stores v. Rose, 274 App. Div. 462, 84 N.Y.S.2d 685, 690 (1st Dep't
1948).
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held that a corporation may be a party to the joint venture.12 The
same is true in California.13 Manacher v. Central Coal Co.,14 however,
is a troublesome New York decision holding that individuals may
not organize a corporation for the sole purpose of carrying on a joint
venture. The New York court did draw a distinction in that case,
however, between the situation where there is a true joint venture
agreement separate and apart from the corporate entity. Therefore,
the Manacher case seems distinguishable and not contrary to the
general rule allowing the formation of joint venture corporations.
Just as a corporation may invest in another close corporation, so too
is it permitted to become a joint venturer with other corporations
forming a corporation to carry on a particular transaction or a series
of related transactions.
In joint venture corporations, as with other closely held corporations,
the participants are torn between choosing the safety of the corporate
form on the one hand and electing the flexibility of the partnership or
joint venture form on the other. In operations of a highly speculative
nature involving immense financial risk, such as the exploration and
production of oil and gas in foreign areas, the limitation of liability
and stability of organization make the corporate form particularly
attractive. At the same time, the participants seek the advantages of
the partnership form, to wit, personal voice in management policy,
opportunity to maintain a pro rata share in the enterprise, and the
ability to choose fellow participants and preclude unwanted outsiders
from joining the undertaking.
Participants in close corporations have employed various devices to
strike the desired balance. 15 Cumulative voting and provisions requir-
ing greater than a majority vote for action by shareholders or the
board of directors have been employed to give to each participant
personal power in policy determination. Limitations on the transfer-
ability of stock and preferential stock purchase arrangements have
been used to prevent unwanted outsiders from coming into the enter-
prise. Agreements among stockholder-participants as to appointment
and removal of officers, dividend policy and other corporate policy
have also been used. These provisions and agreements have been re-
corded either in the articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or in
independent agreements.
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS SUSTAINED
Joint venture corporations have been used in a number of industries
12. Sand Springs Home v. Dail, 187 Okla. 431, 103 P.2d 524 (1940).
13. California Consolidated Furniture Manufacturers v. Goldstein, 140 Cal.
App. 563, 35 P.2d 627 (1934).
14. 284 App. Div. 380, 131 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1954).
15. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953).
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in the United States. In the post-Civil War railroad building era, joint
ventures were employed to build railroads, to construct and operate
terminals and to provide a pool of special kinds of equipment such as
refrigerator cars. In the construction industry, joint venture corpora-
tions have been used for gigantic tasks such as the Grand Coulee Dam
and the Boulder Dam Project. At present, joint venture corporations
are being used more frequently and on a larger scale in the petroleum
industry than in any other area of American industry. We shall sub-
sequently discuss in more detail some examples of the current use of
the joint venture corporation in American industry.
Some courts have taken a realistic approach to these agreements
and have not rigidly applied principles of corporation law designed
primarily for public issue corporations. Illustrative of these cases is
Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co. 16 That case involved
an agreement among a number of railroads for the organization of
a separate corporation to manage the refrigerator cars operating on
their lines. The contract defined the respective interests of the rail-
roads in the refrigerator company and provided in detail for the dis-
tribution of its earnings. In an action to compel distribution of earnings
in accordance with the contract, the court rejected the argument that
declaration of dividends was a matter left to the discretion of the
directors. While recognizing this to be a requirement of orthodox
corporate law, the court stated that:
[Tjhere is no particular divinity surrounding the term "corporation."
The courts will look through the form to get at the real intent of the
association of individuals or corporations forming the organization, and,
if rights of third parties have not intervened, will give effect to the real
purpose of the organization in order to promote square dealing and effec-
tuate justice.
The stockholders' contract . . . provides that the surplus accruing from
all sources shall be distributed (after payment of expenses and rentals
of cars) by the refrigerator company to the three railroad companies,
signers of the same, in certain proportions therein specified. There was
no discretion in the refrigerator company as to how the fund should be
distributed. It was under the compulsion of a contract obligation to make
distribution of all "surplus accruing from all sources" according to the
terms of the contract.1 7
The court made no mention of the fact that section 12 of the New
Jersey General Corporation Act of April 21, 1896,18 under which the
corporation was organized, provided that: "the business of every
corporation shall be managed by its directors."
16. 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925).
17. Id. at 343-44, 346.
18. N.J. Sess. Laws 1896, c. 185 § 12 p. 281. (Now NEW JERSEY REV. STAT.§ 14:7-1 (1937).
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Similarly in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Des Moines Union Ry.,19
the Supreme Court held that the interest in a joint venture terminal
corporation should be determined according to the terms of the agree-
ment of the joint venture rather than according to later inconsistent
corporate action taken by scheming stockholders. The Court took
the position that the joint venture transactions established a trust for
the benefit of the joint venturers. It struck down the formal corporate
machinations such as amendment of articles of incorporation and
acquisition of stock certificates, etc., upon which the various corpora-
tion officials based their authority. Likewise in Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n,20 a joint venture terminal company
was treated as the agency of these who established it, since the law
deals with "the substance of the transaction involved as if the cor-
porate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may re-
quire."2 1
In the cases discussed above, the courts have indicated that express
arrangements between corporate joint venturers should be construed
with less emphasis on the corporate form of the joint venture and the
ordinary rules of law usually applied to corporate entities and with
more consideration given to the nature of the agreement between
joint venturers. However, in Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry.,22 a North Carolina court went further and, despite the
absence of an express agreement, gave effect to an implied joint
venture arrangement. The court implied from the acts of the rail-
roads establishing a bridge company that each had equal rights to
the use of the rail facilities of the joint venture bridge company. The
implied agreement as to these rights was held controlling, notwith-
standing contrary formal action by the corporation. The court said:
The Bridge Company has no independent status or interest. Whatever
the outcome of this controversy between its co-owners, the Bridge Com-
pany stands neither to gain nor to lose. It receives no revenues, pays no
bills. Again, we advert to the fact that the co-owners pay no charge to
the Bridge Company for the use of its facilities. As to operational and
maintenance costs they pay its bills in the proportion determined on the
wheelage or user basis and each pays 50% of its capital outlay costs.
It holds legal title to properties. But in essence it is simply used by Sea-
board and Coast Line, its co-owners, as a device to work out details of the
usage of the jointly owned facilities. It is an instrumentality of its co-
owners. Their rights, inter se, in respect of the use of the Bridge Company
facilities, do not depend upon action of stockholders and directors within
the corporate form. As heretofore observed, they spring from the nature
of the original incorporation, confirmed by usage and course of dealings
19. 254 U.S. 196 (1920).
20. 247 U.S. 490 (1918).
21. Id. at 501.
22. 240 N.C. 495, 82 S.E.2d 771 (1954).
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across the years. Seaboard's position is predicated upon legal rights
vested in it as successor to an incorporator. Its position is quite different
from a stockholder whose rights spring solely from stock ownership.23
These cases present situations similar to that involved in the Aber-
crombie case, in that in general they deal with joint ventures in which
the participants themselves are corporations rather than individuals.
However, whether the joint venture corporation is composed of in-
dividuals rather than corporations apparently seems to make no
difference to the courts that demonstrate an understanding of, or at
least, a realistic approach to joint venture corporation agreements. In
DeBoy v. Harris,24 plaintiff and defendants had entered into a joint
venture for the construction and leasing of buildings, which they agreed
to carry out through the formation of a Maryland corporation. They
also fixed the participation by the parties in the venture through
the issuance of stock, and agreed that the parties were to devote their
full time to the venture and serve as officers of the corporation at a
specified salary. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the
defendants had breached the agreement between them by removing
plaintiff as an officer and director of the corporation and by issuing
additional shares of stock. The action of the trial court in sustaining
a demurrer to the complaint was reversed by the Maryland Court
of Appeals in a decision reviewing many of the authorities in the field.
The court of appeals noted the decisions in the early New Jersey
case of Jackson v. Hooper,2 and similar cases holding that joint ven-
ture agreements entered into prior to incorporation are contrary to
public policy and invalid because they deprive the directors of dis-
cretion in managing the business of the corporation. The court refused
to follow this conservative line of decisions, however, relying instead
on the cases holding that incorporation of a joint venture does not
change the essential nature of the relationship and that the courts
will look through the corporate form and give effect to the intentions
of the parties when the rights of third parties are not in issue.
In Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc.,26 the Michigan Blue Sky
Law was held not to apply to the issuance of certificates of stock to a
number of private persons. Even though the transfer of the stock was
within the literal meaning of the statute, the court held that the law
does not apply where a corporation is used merely as a convenient
method of carrying into effect a joint venture.
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted this same approach
in Beardsley v. Beardsley.2 7 That case involved two brothers who were
23. 82 S.E.2d at 785.
24. 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955).
25. 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
26. 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571, amended, 296 Mich. 773, 299 N.W. 451 (1941).
27. 138 U.S. 262 (1891).
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engaged in building a small railroad in Arkansas in the last quarter
of the nineteenth century. The Court construed their relationship as
primarily a joint venture rather than as one of mere stockholders in
the corporation that had been formed to carry on the construction
work.
The same approach was used by a California court in Hunt v. Davis.28
The litigants there were joint venturers in a newspaper that failed.
According to the court, the rights of the parties could be more justly
determined by considering the corporation which they had formed
as a mere agency to more conveniently carry out their agreement.
The court looked to the agreement as the basis for determining their
rights. The corporation was considered the trustee of their respective
interests.
In these, as in all other cases presenting close legal questions as to
the extent to which corporate form should control, the effort to achieve
an equitable result has much to do with the approach of the court.
Usually this unarticulated major premise will not be expressed but
is nevertheless present and is of controlling importance. In the cases
discussed immediately above, the courts undoubtedly thought that
substantial justice lay with those litigants who relied on the joint
venture agreement rather than with the litigants who relied on the
orthodox principles of corporation law. A California court has
expressed this position in the form of a general proposition of law:
"If a corporation or a formal partnership is a mere agency for the
purpose of convenience in carrying out a joint venture agreement, and
independent and innocent third parties, such as creditors or stock-
holders, are not injured . .. justice would seem to demand that in
determining the rights of the parties they be placed in the position
each occupied under the original agreement. '29
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS HELD INVALID
On the other hand, if these same courts had concluded that sub-
stantial justice lay on the other side of the question, the opinions easily
could have been written with reliance on the general principles of
corporation law. For instance, in West v. Camden,30 the Supreme
Court of the United States held an independent contract of em-
ployment between the president of the corporation and the gen-
eral manager to be violative of public policy. According to the Court,
the agreement might bind the president who held 5/6 of the stock of
the corporation to act contrary to the interests of the other stock-
holders. It is worthy of note that the general manager held half of
28. 135 Cal. 31, 66 Pac. 957 (1901).29. Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651, 659 (1943).
30. 135 U.S. 507 (1890).
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the remaining outstanding shares which meant that only nine per cent
of the shares were distributed among other stockholders. Again, in
Jackson v. Hooper,31 the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
refused to enforce a joint venture agreement which was inconsistent
with subsequent corporate action. The case involved publishers of the
Encyclopedia Brittanica who used the corporate form but operated
as partners. They each held half the total stock in the corporation.
The court expressed the orthodox corporate approach to the matter
as follows:
It is fundamental that, no matter how the shares of stock are held, the
corporation itself is an entity wholly separate and distinct from the indi-
viduals who compose and control it. The complainant and the defendant,
though owning the entire capital stock of the two corporations, are not,
as expressed by Chief Justice Waite in the leading case of Pullman's
Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 115 U.S. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. 194,
29 L. Ed. 499, "the corporation, in the sense of that term as applied to the
management of the corporate business or the control of the corporate
property." The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business
as partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain the advantages and
immunities of a corporate form, and then, Proteuslike, become at will a
copartnership or a corporation, as the exigencies or purposes of their
joint enterprise may from time to time require. The policy of the law is
to the contrary. If the parties have the rights of partners, they have the
duties and liabilities imposed by law, and are responsible in solido to all
creditors. If they adopt the corporate form, with the corporate shield
extended over them to protect them against personal liability, they cease
to be partners, and have only the rights, duties, and obligations of stock-
holders. They cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation as to the
rest of the world. Furthermore, upon grounds of public policy, the doctrine
contended for cannot be tolerated, as it renders nugatory and void the
authority of the Legislature-a co-ordinate branch of the government-
established by the Constitution, in respect to the creation, supervision, and
winding up of corporations. 3 2
The court supported its decision with the citation of ample author-
ity including an early English decision, Salomon v. Salomon & Co.33
The trend of the law, in the writers' view, should be away from the
corporate conceptualism dominating judicial opinions, as in Jackson
v. Hooper,34 and in the direction of cases like Wabash Ry. v. American
Refrigerator Transit Co.,35 and DeBoy v. Harris.36 Where a joint
venture agreement works no injustice on independent third parties
it should be given effect. The human and social value in honoring
one's agreement and all the factors that give integrity to contracts
31. 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 Atl. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
32. 75 Atl. at 571.
33. [1897] A.C. 22.
34. See note 25 supra.
35. 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925).
36. See note 24 supra.
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freely entered into far outweigh any advantage derived from adher-
ence to the letter but not the spirit of a general corporation statute.
Emphasis on the letter but not the spirit of the statute in addition
to falling short of higher standards of judicial equity creates many
practical problems. It increases the number of situations in which
a lawyer will find it difficult to predict whether specific agreements
desired by businessmen involving no harm to third parties would,
if challenged, be upheld or stricken down by courts. Witness the
hair splitting distinction of the New York courts between what is
and what is not permissible slight deviation from the corporate norm.
In Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co.,37 the
court struck down an agreement whereby certain stockholders were
given authority to manage theaters belonging to the corporation. The
court said the agreement "sterilized" the powers of the directors over
the management of the corporation theatres in violation of the General
Corporation Law of the state.
However, an earlier New York case, Clark v. Dodge,38 had upheld an
agreement which resided full managerial control of the corporation in
one of the two stockholders. The court in that case said: "If the
enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-not even, in
any perceptible degree, the public-one sees no reason for holding it
illegal, even though it impinges slightly upon the broad provisions of
section 27." 39 Clark v. Dodge was decided after two earlier New York
decisions40 in which the court had stricken down similar agreements
to control the discretion of the board of directors.
As in other jurisdictions, the recent tendency in New York is to
accommodate as much as possible the reasonable expectations of
businessmen in utilizing the corporate form for the operation of a
joint venture. The New York courts have frequently upheld agree-
ments providing for arbitration of management policies in the event
of disagreement. 41 Ripley v. Storer,2 approved by-laws requiring
stockholder approval of all contracts made by the directors for more
than one year and of all directors' resolutions providing for bonuses
37. 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
38. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
39. Id. at 642, referring to N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 27. "The business of a
corporation shall be managed by its board of directors."
40. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
41. Application of Landersman, 280 App. Div. 963, 116 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1st
Dep't 1952); Application of Carl, 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1st Dep't
1942); Application of De Caro, 261 App. Div. 975, 25 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't
1941); Martocci v. Martocci, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct), affd, 266 App. Div.
840, 43 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1st Dep't 1943); O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely
Held Corporations: Intra Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARv. L. Rsv. 786 (1954).
42. 1 Misc. 2d 281, 139 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 286 App. Div. 844, 142
N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1955), modified in other respects, 309 N.Y. 506, 132
N.E.2d 87 (1956).
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over a specified amount to corporate officials. Simonson v. Helburn,43
sustained a sweeping agreement among stockholders of a theatre guild
which, among other things, provided for changes in the capital struc-
ture of the company, instructed the directors as to who were to be
employed as officers of the corporation, gave those officers as such
and not as directors the exclusive power to select plays and engage
actors, and gave others the power to dissolve the corporation and
required that they be hired as an advisory board at fixed salaries.
Other decisions have upheld agreements among shareholders to vote
for themselves as directors and as directors to vote for themselves
as officers.44
In the light of the conflicting line of decisions dealing with the proper
relation between the joint venture and the corporate entity, it is of
interest to examine in detail provisions and agreements which have
been employed by various joint venture corporations in American
industry. A principle of law which is either evaded or ignored in
business practice, absent other compelling considerations of public
policy, should not long survive.
USE BY AmERIcAN INDusTRY OF THE JOINT VENTURE CORPORATION
The Construction Industry
While the corporate joint venture may not now be as popular in the
construction business as it once was, it is, however, known to that
industry. Especially is this true in the heavy construction field. For
instance, construction work on the Boulder Canyon Project was done
by a joint venture corporation formed by six large construction com-
panies and known as the "Six Companies, Inc. ' 45
According to counsel for the Six Companies, Inc. there was no
pre-incorporation agreement signed by the stockholders of that com-
pany. Similiarly, the attorney for the Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc.,
one of the six corporate venturers who formed Six Companies, Inc.,
has advised the writers that he was
informed that the several corporate shareholders of this corporation
occupied the same position with respect to control over the actions of the
directors as to individual stockholders of corporations generally. Insofar
as we know, the organizers of Six Companies, Inc., did not enter into a
stockholders' voting agreement, and each stockholder participated in
the management of the corporation only in that degree accorded to each
by the laws of the state of incorporation and the charter and the by-laws.
43. 198 Misc. 430, 97 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
44. Lockley v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d 895 (1950); Cohen v. Wacht,
124 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 282 App. Div. 1054, 126 N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d
Dep't 1953); Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Blum v. Ox-
man, 190 Misc. 647, 75 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1947); In re Block's Will, 186
Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
45. Six Companies, Inc. v. Di Vinney, 2 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1933).
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Of course, in the case of the Six Companies, Inc., and that of the Transbay
Construction Company which was organized a year or so afterward, each
stockholder was represented by a director, presumably by informal agree-
ment of the group and consequently there was no divergence of interest
by the stockholders and directors. (Emphasis added.)
Despite counsel's disclaimer, the underscored portion of his remarks
indicates that through informal agreement of the stockholders there
was a significant departure from ordinary corporate arrangements in
that directors were, in effect, named by the stockholders they repre-
sented, rather than being elected by all.
In addition to the Six Companies, Inc., as already noted, construction
on the Grand Coulee Dam was performed by a joint venture corpora-
tion formed by four construction companies. This was the Mason-
Walsh-Atkinson-Kyer Company. The company served as agent of
the four corporate stockholders in connection with all the work done
on the dam. The amended complaint filed by the plaintiff in Silas
Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'r,46 states that the Mason-Walsh-Atkinson-
Kyer Company was the "alter ego" of the stockholder principals and
was an "entity brought into being by them for the more convenient
and economic doing of the work under the contract" with the United
States. In the Silas Mason case the Supreme Court of the United
States adopted this characterization of the joint venture corporation.
It is evident that the joint venture corporation has been used in
the construction industry but that its present use is not widespread.
Generally, the larger construction companies who are faced with the
problem of organizing a joint venture prefer to maintain a definite
distinction between corporate organization and joint venture organiza-
tion. In those situations where the corporate form of organization
would best suit their purposes they organize a corporation, but exer-
cise control as a stockholder thereof in the same manner and to the
same extent as is common with corporations generally. It appears
that while joint venture arrangements are fairly common and well
known in the heavy construction industry, the joint venture corpora-
tion as such is not in wide use at present.
The Railroad Industry
Attention has already been called to the use to which railroad com-
panies at times have put the joint venture corporation in operating
terminals, refrigerator companies, and switching lines. The case
materials to which we have previously referred supply examples of
favorable judicial reaction to such use of the corporate mechanism by
the railroad industry. In addition to this, there are other railroad
companies presently making use of the joint venture corporation. For
46. 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
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instance, the Railway Express Company is a joint venture corporation.
The entire stock of the company is held in varying proportions by
most of the railroad companies of the country. The agreement between
the Railway Express Company and the railroads which make up its
stockholders imposes significant limitations on the authority ordinarily
exercised by the board of directors in the case of the conventional
corporation. Weight restrictions, tariff charges, and restrictions on
the use by Railway Express Company of non-railroad transportation
media are all subject to the control and direction of the stockholders
of Railway Express. The earnings of Railway Express are distributed
on the basis of the volume of Railway Express business done on the
lines of the respective carrier stockholders. In addition, the railroad
stockholders can complain of actions or decisions by the board of
directors of Railway Express and in case they disagree with them, the
matter is submitted to arbitration or, in the alternative, determination
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The agreement between he
railroad stockholders who own Railway Express imposes other im-
portant and unusual restrictions on the powers ordinarily vested in
the board of directors. Thus, under their agreement with Railway
Express, an individual railroad has the right to have any employee
of Railway Express who may be objectionable to it removed or dis-
charged. The agreement also requires that the business of Railway
Express Company is to be conducted by the board of directors in a
manner that is "satisfactory" to the railroads.
In addition to the case of the Railway Express Company, agreements
pertaining to a number of other joint venture corporations which have
been established by groups of railroads are of interest. These are:
an agreement between four railroads establishing the Chicago Union
Station Company, an Illinois corporation which is a jointly operated
company for handling the passenger, mail and express traffic of the
proprietary companies; 47 an agreement relating to the Houston Belt &
Terminal Railroad Co., a Texas corporation, which serves as a terminal
railroad established by a number of southeastern roads;48 an agree-
ment concerning the Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company,
a terminal company established by five railroads and organized under
the laws of Illinois;49 an agreement relating to the Joplin Union Depot
Company, a Missouri corporation, which is a station company owned
by three railroad stockholders; 0 an agreement involving Pueblo Union
Depot & Railroad Company, a Colorado corporation which serves as
a terminal company owned in equal shares by four western roads;51
47. Exhibit No. 29, Matter of Chicago Union Station Co., 70 I.C.C. 191 (1921).
48. Exhibit No. 7, Houston Belt & Terminal Ry., 275 I.C.C. 289 (1950).
49. Exhibit No. 7, Chicago & Western Indiana Ry., 271 I.C.C. 815 (1948).
50. Exhibit No. 1, Joplin Union Depot Co. Bonds, 239 I.C.C. 491 (1940).
51. Exhibit No. 7, I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 14518.
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Salt Lake City Union Depot and Railroad Company, a Utah corpora-
tion, operating as a station and terminal company owned equally by
two western roads;5 2 Joliet Union Depot Company, an Illinois cor-
poration, serving as a depot company the stock of which is held in
equal parts by three railroads; 3 and Northern Pacific Terminal com-
pany, a terminal company owned, though not in equal proportion,
by three roads and organized under the laws of Oregon.54
The agreements relating to these terminal companies illustrate
typical restrictions imposed by the railroad stockholders on the board
of directors of such jointly owned companies. These restrictions in-
clude: (1) the vesting of control over the selection and retention of
employees in the stockholders; (2) the distribution of profits or surplus
on the basis of use and not in proportion to stock ownership; and (3)
providing for the arbitration of disputes arising either between stock-
holders themselves or between one of themselves or between one of
them and the joint venture company. At the same time each of the
states in which these corporations are incorporated has the typical
statutory provision to the effect that the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed by a board of directors.55
Maritime Industry
An example of an agreement employed in the maritime industry is
the agreement dated April 23, 1947, between Lykes Bros. Steamship
Company, Inc. and Grace Line, Inc., providing for the formation of
Gulf & South American Steamship Company, Inc.56 This jointly held
company is a Louisiana corporation established to provide steamship
service in the foreign trade. The agreement between the two corporate
joint venturers, approved by the Federal Maritime Board, provides
that general control and management of the business is to be vested
in a board of directors of four, "upon which there shall at all times
be two directors representing Grace and two directors representing
Lykes." The first board of directors of the new company was named
in the agreement between the two joint venturers. The agreement
between them further provides that the parties may at any time
change their representatives on the board of directors. The chairman-
ship of the board of directors is required to be alternated between
representatives of the two stockholders on an annual basis. In the case
of a deadlock on the board of directors of four or between the two
52. Exhibit No. 7, I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 14695.
53. Exhibit No. 7, I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 14563.
54. Exhibit No. (b)-7, Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 282 I.C.C. 807 (1951).
55. Illinois: ILL. ANw. STAT. C. 32, § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Missouri:
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.310 (1949); Oregon: ORE. REv. STAT. c. 70, § 47.180 (1953);
Texas: Tax. Civ. STAT. AwN. art. 1327 (Supp. 1957); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-2-21 (1953).
56. Federal Maritime Board Contract No. 7612.
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stockholders, with respect to any matter pertaining to the business of
the company, the issue is to be settled by arbitration. Under the agree-
ment between Lykes and Grace the new corporation is required to
appoint Lykes as its sole traffic agent at United States Gulf ports, with
the exception of New Orleans, and is required to appoint Grace as its
sole traffic agent on the west coast. Moreover, the new company must
establish its principal operating headquarters at New Orleans, Lou-
isiana.
The Mining Industry
The joint venture corporation has been employed also in the mining
industry. An example of this is TAMAS, a Turkish corporation, but
a joint venture owned by the Newmont Mining Corporation of New
York and Etibank, an operating agency of the Turkish government.
There is an agreement between Newmont and Etibank concerning
the operations of TAMAS. Under the agreement, the joint venture
corporation is required to report and account periodically to Etibank.
The joint venture corporation is required to give Etibank an opportun-
ity of participating in the development of production in any areas
which have been under exploration by TAMAS. Etibank must be given
an opportunity to approve and participate in any production program
contemplated by TAMAS with respect to any such area. Disputes
which arise between the joint venture corporation, TAMAS, and
Etibank are to be settled by arbitration.
While one of the co-owners of TAMAS is the corporate instrumen-
tality of a foreign government, the agreement between the Newmont
Mining Company and Etibank furnishes an example that, as in the
case of overseas oil exploration, so, too, with respect to overseas mining
opportunities the joint venture corporation is a device of which impor-
tant use sometimes is made. It is not possible to determine the exact ex-
tent to which the joint venture corporation has been employed in
United States mining operations. However a number of American min-
ing corporations are owned jointly by other mining companies and it
reasonably can be assumed that some are joint ventures.
Communications
In the communication field there are at least two examples of the
use of the joint venture corporation of which the authors have knowl-
edge. One of these is Press Wireless, Inc., a Delaware corporation, an
international communications common carrier. It is jointly owned
by, and provides radio services for, newspapers and press associations.
The articles of incorporation of this company provide that the corpora-
tion may in its bylaws fix the number (not less than the number
required by law, however) of the shares of stock the holders of which
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must approve specific acts by the board of directors of Press Wireless,
Inc. The articles of incorporation also impose a limitation on the
amount of stock which one press interest may own directly or in-
directly at any one time.
The second example is Aeronautical Radio, Inc., a Delaware corpora-
tion. It is a joint venture corporation formed to provide a system of
radio communications serving aircraft operators. It is jointly owned
by a number of airlines, large and small. The bylaws of AIRINC pro-
vide for the refunding of profits in proportion to the use of the com-
panies' services by the individual airlines and not on the basis of
stock ownership. Also, as in the case of Press Wireless, Inc., the bylaws
of AIRINC prohibit any airline, or group of airlines under a common
ownership, from obtaining "control of the policies or actions of
AIRINC." To that end, no airline nor group of affiliated airlines may
own "directly or indirectly or control the vote of, more than twenty
per cent of the total authorized capital stock of AIRINC, or more
than 33 1/3 per cent of its total capital stock actually issued and out-
standing at ony one time."
Electric Power
Examination of the registration statements of several electric utility
corporations which are on file with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission reveals that the joint venture corporation is also known in
this industry. The rather well publicized "Dixon-Yates" electric power
matter exemplifies the use of the joint venture corporation in the
electric power field. "Dixon-Yates" sought to supply electric power
to the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Atomic Energy Commission
in replacement of power which TVA provided for certain facilities
of AEC. The two electric utility companies involved were Middle
Southern Utilities, Inc. (MSU) and the Southern Company (South-
ern). These two utilities agreed with each other to establish an operat-
ing company which would supply the power which they had agreed
to sell to AEC. The joint venture company established by MSU and
Southern was the Mississippi Valley Generating Company (MVG).
The agreement between MSU and Southern pertaining to the organ-
ization and operation of MVG affords each the right to designate
representatives on the board of directors of MVG.57 The two companies
pledge that VIVG will not enter into contracts or commitments con-
cernmg the sale of power to AEC by MVG without the approval of
both MSU and Southern. In addition, there are provisions regarding
rights of MSU and Southern to any surplus of electric power over
that which MVG is required to make available for sale and disposal
to facilities of the AEC. Although, as we know, the "Dixon-Yates"
57. S.E.C. File No. 70-3319, Exhibit L.
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proposals were finally rejected by the Government, if those proposals
had been accepted and the enterprise allowed to proceed, MVG would
have provided an interesting illustration of recent resort to the joint
venture corporation in a novel situation arising in the electric power
industry.
Air Transportation
An example of a joint venture corporation operating in the air trans-
portation industry is Air Cargo, Inc., a Delaware corporation, organ-
ized and operated to perform certain traffic services and facilities in
connection with the handling of air cargo for air carriers. The stock-
holders of Air Cargo, Inc., are all airlines holding varying proportions
of its stock. The agreement between the participating stockholders
in this joint venture provides for significant departures from the usual
method of electing the directors of a corporation.58 For instance, one
nominee must be designated by at least five airline members of the
board of directors and that nominee may not be an officer, director
or employee of any party to the joint venture agreement. Again, the
parties pledge themselves to vote their stock for the election of one
nominee who must be the incumbent of the office or president of the
Air Transportation Association of America. The stockholders further
commit themselves to vote for four nominees designated (one each)
of the four largest stockholders of record. Finally, one nominee must
be designated by each of the stockholders, apart from the four largest
shareholders. In the case of any vacancy arising on the board, the
parties agree to cast their votes for the election of a nominee who has
been designated in the same manner as the member whose death,
resignation or disqualification caused the vacancy.
The Petroleum Industry
A. Domestic: Perhaps in no other American industry is there so
much use being made at present of the joint venture corporation as
in the oil and gas industry. This holds true both as to the domestic
phases of that industry and in connection with the exploration and
development of foreign oil and gas properties. There is a reasonable
explanation for this. The considerations which convince businessmen to
make use of joint venture corporations probably apply with special
force in the petroleum industry. Speculative investments involving a
high degree of risk of failure, requiring large and continued expend-
itures and, very often, a considerable personnel force are frequently
the prospects which face those who are engaged in the exploration,
development and production of oil and gas in the United States and
abroad. Moreover, the depletion allowance provided under the Internal
58. C.A.B. File 1041.
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Revenue Code minimizes any tax disadvantage in the use of the cor-
porate form in the oil and gas industry. Under these circumstances,
distribution of the expenses, the effort, and the risk involved among
a number of interested oil and gas companies is often mandatory.
The device frequently used in such situations to achieve these purposes
has been the joint venture and often in its corporate form.
An example of the joint venture corporation in this field is Amurex
Oil Development Company which is composed of three companies:
Ashland Oil and Refining Co.; The Murphy Corporation of Eldorado,
Arkansas; and A. G. Becker & Co., a Chicago corporation. Extracts
from the registration statement which Amurex filed with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission on January 11, 1953, indicate that
Amurex is a Delaware corporation.59 It was organized to engage in
the business of prospecting for and acquiring oil and natural gas
properties in the western provinces of Canada and the western states
of this country. The prospectus filed by Amurex as part of its registra-
tion statement explains the reasons for the registrant's use of a joint
venture corporation. It applies in other situations as well:
This procedure of carrying on oil exploration and development activities
through joint operations is common in the petroleum industry and is
practiced by many of the largest as well as the medium-sized and small
companies. Such a course is expected to result in a greater distribution of
risk and makes it possible, with given funds, to prospect much larger areas
than would otherwise be feasible. As indicated above, Ashland and
Murphy are now participating in a number of joint undertakings and
each participates frequently with others.
The joint venture corporation has also been quite extensively used
in connection with the construction and operation of both oil and
natural gas transmission or pipelines. These involve, of course, heavy
costs, both of construction and of operation and maintenance. The
Federal Trade Commission records the following pipeline companies
as corporations which are owned jointly by other oil or natural gas
companies: 60 Great Lakes Pipeline Company (owned jointly by Conti-
nental Oil, Midcontinent Petroleum, Skelly Oil, Texas Company, Pure
Oil, Cities Service, Sinclair Oil, and Phillips Petroleum Company);
Detroit Southern Pipeline Company (owned jointly by Pure Oil, Gulf
Oil and Sun Oil); Natural Gas Pipe (owned jointly by Cities Service,
Texas Company, Standard of New Jersey, People Gas Light & Coke
Company, South Western Development Company and Columbian
Carbon Company); Ajax Pipe Line Company (owned jointly by Stand-
ard of Ohio, Pure Oil, and Standard of New Jersey); Plantation Pipe-
line Company (owned jointly by Standard of New Jersey, Standard
59. Registration Statement S - 9375.
60. FTC, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIaECTORATEs 365 (1951).
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of Kentucky, and Shell Union Company); Wyco Pipeline Company
(owned jointly by the Texas Company, Sacony Vacuum, and Stand-
ard of Indiana). Processing companies, too, are often the joint venture
of several oil companies. For instance, Neches Butane Products Com-
pany is jointly owned by the Texas Company, Gulf Oil, Sacony
Vacuum, Pure Oil and Atlantic Refining Company.61
B. Foreign Exploration and Development: It is in this area that
joint venture corporations, such as American Independent Oil Com-
pany involved in the Abercrombie case, abound. Many of these,
but by no means all, are owned in whole or in part by groups of
American oil companies. Perhaps the most extensive listing of ex-
amples of the use of jointly used companies in overseas oil exploration
and development may be found in a report of the staff of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission entitled "International Petroleum Cartel.' 62
Throughout this report may be found a number of references to the
extensive use of the corporate joint venture by oil companies en-
gaged in exploring or developing oil and gas reserves abroad.
While the tenor of the report of the staff of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, understandably, is hostile to the overseas operations of major
American oil companies because of alleged antitrust implications,
nevertheless, the report attests to the fact that joint venture corpo-
rations are almost the rule, rather than the exception, in this very
important industry. For instance, the report observes that:
Joint ownership of affiliated companies is probably more widespread in
the international petroleum industry than in any other field of enterprise.
The major international oil companies use the joint-ownership technique
not only in conducting foreign operations but also in their operations in
the United States and Canada. This is particularly true with respect to
control of pipe lines and companies holding patents on technological
processes. Thus, the international companies, operating in the United
States and Canada, are joined with the large domestic oil companies in the
two operations where control is likely to exert the maximum of influence
on the industry.
Also, the boards of directors that manage the myriad of jointly owned
corporations may, in effect, be private planning boards where differences
are resolved and where an oil policy for the world can be established.
In subsequent sections of the report, the Commission's staff discusses
particular overseas oil companies of this type. We note here only
those which pertain to corporations in which American oil companies
participated as shareholders or joint venturers. They include: Basrah
Petroleum Company, Ltd. (23.75% of this jointly owned company is
held by Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum
Company, the rest of its stock being held by British, Dutch and French
61. Id. at 368.
62. Hearings Before Subcommittee on Monopoly, Senate Select Committee
on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Comm. Print, No. 6 (1952).
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interests); Kuwait Oil Company, Ltd. (holding a 75% concession
granted in 1934 and covering all of the Sheikdom of Kuwait and
owned 50% by the American Gulf Oil Company); Bahrein Petroleum
Company (owned in equal parts by the Standard Oil Company of
California and the Texas Company); Arabian American Oil Company
(holding a concession in Saudi Arabia and owned jointly by Standard
Oil Company of California, Texas Company, Standard Oil of New
York and Socony-Vacuum); Turkish Petroleum Company (jointly
owned by a group of American oil companies along with British,
Dutch and Persian interests);63 Aramco (jointly owned corporation
in which four American companies, Jersey Standard, Socony-Vacuum,
Standard of California and Texas Company participate along with
European interests); and the Mene Grande Oil Company (a joint
enterprise of the Gulf, Standard of New Jersey and Shell Oil Com-
panies).
C. Typical Provisions: A few agreements pertaining to joint venture
oil corporations organized and operated for the purpose of exploring
and developing foreign oil resources are of interest. The agreements
relate to the following: Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Co. (Trans-Arabian);
Middle East Pipelines, Ltd. (Middle East); Turkish Petroleum Com-
pany, Ltd. (Turkish Petroleum); Arabian American Oil Co. (Arabian
American); Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. (Iranian); and Irican Agency, Ltd.
(Irican). Three of these, Trans-Arabian, Arabian American and
Irican, are Delaware corporations. The corporate organizers of the
six oil companies have laid significant restrictions upon powers which,
in the case of public issue corporations, ordinarily are exercised by a
board of directors. We summarize herein a number of these restric-
tions.
The provisions by means of which the stockholders of these six
overseas joint venture oil companies restrict or control the managerial
powers given their boards of directors are of several types. For in-
stance, nearly all vest sole power in the stockholders to make by-laws.
Most of these six companies also operate pursuant to requirements
imposed that more than a majority of the stockholders must approve
changes in the by-laws, or in the articles of incorporation. In some
cases, more than a majority of the stockholders is required to approve
any disposition of the assets of the corporation and there are also pro-
63. "Close cooperation was required of the groups in the administration and
management of TPC. Each group holding a 23.75 percent share was termed a
major group and was entitled to appoint two directors. Participations and in-
vestments (Gulbenkian) was termed a minor group and entitled to one direc-
tor. (Any appointed director could select an alternate director.) In addition to
the directors appointed by the groups, one director could be appointed by theGovernment of Iraq; the TPC Board could elect a chairman and a managingdirector, but the number of directors could never exceed 12, and resolutions
could be passed at a board meeting only if 3 major groups voted favorably."FTC, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 65 (1951).
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visions which require greater than a majority vote with respect to
all stockholder action.
The agreement among the participants in the Iranian Oil Co., Ltd.,
contains a number of interesting provisions affording stockholder con-
trol over the authority of the board of directors to manage the com-
pany. For instance, the agreement provides that:
N. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Articles of Association
for the time being of the Company any Director may request at a meeting
of the Board that any resolution submitted to the Board for its consider-
ation (whether the Board takes a decision thereon or not at that meeting)
shall be submitted instead to the Company in General Meeting, and upon
any such request the Directors shall forthwith convene a General Meeting
for the purpose of considering the said resolution. The Directors shall
thereafter give full effect to the decision of the Company thereon and
failing such decision no action on the resolution may be taken by the
Board.
The agreement also gives any stockholder the right to call a special
meeting for the election of directors, which right cannot be abridged
save by the unanimous consent of all the other stockholders.
There are also provisions found among the documents pertaining to
the organization and operation of these six oil companies which re-
quire that director action, as well as stockholder action, must obtain
approval of greater than a majority of the holders of capital stock in
order to be effective. For example, the articles of incorporation of
Middle East provide that the "lowest majority for the passing of a
resolution at a meeting of the Directors of the Pipe Line Company
shall be more than 66 2/3 per cent of the total number of votes capable
of being cast by all the directors . . . ." Likewise, the agreement be-
tween the stockholders of Turkish Petroleum requires that the
articles of incorporation of that" company must be altered so as to
provide:
that Resolutions at Board Meetings can only be carried if the Directors or
one of the Directors appointed by at least three of the Major Groups vote
in favour thereof-and that no Resolution at a General Meeting of Share-
holders shall be carried unless the votes attaching to the Shares then held
by at least three of the Major Groups be cast in favour of it.
Again, in the selection, election, or removal of directors of these six
joint venture oil companies operating abroad, the stockholders thereof
have exhibited considerable caution to preserve their control. They
have attempted to insure that the directors designated or elected to
serve on the board of directors of these joint venture companies are
responsible to and represent the stockholders who designate or elect
them. For example, the agreement among the participating stock-
holders in Middle East provides that the stockholders shall have the
19581
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
right to appoint directors in a number based on the percentage of the
company stock held by the dominating stockholders. The stockholders'
agreement relative to participation in Turkish Petroleum provides that
each of the majority group of stockholders may appoint two directors
to the board and that the minor group may appoint one. Affiliates, or
"Operating Companies," established by Turkish Petroleum, must also
have a board of directors to which directors are appointed in the same
manner and based on the same proportion of stock holdings as are
required with respect to the appointing of a director to the board
of the parent company. The participants' agreement relative to the
Iranian Oil Company provides that each member of the participating
groups "shall be entitled to appoint to and maintain on the Board a
number of directors which shall vary according to the number of
shares of which such member is the registered holder . . ." thereof.
The actual number of directors a stockholder may appoint is com-
puted with reference to a formula which permits a member company
owning more than five per cent but less than forty per cent of the
stock to appoint one director, and member companies holding more
than forty per cent to appoint two directors. A quorum for any meet-
ing of the board of directors requires the presence of the director ap-
pointed by each member of the group entitled to appoint a director to
the board.
There are other provisions which represent deviations from those
which usually govern the relations between a corporation and its
stockholders. Illustrative are provisions which guarantee that: the
participating company have a preferential right to a pro rata share
in the product of the joint venture oil company; that the stockholder's
preferential rights to purchase additional shares issued by the com-
pany may not be abridged; and that disputes arising between stock-
holders are to be settled by arbitration.
CONCLUSION
In an effort to distribute the risk, maximize the use of investment
capital and divide heavy costs of construction and operation, we have
seen that American industry has often turned to the joint venture
corporation. The provisions of the agreements noted herein exemplify
the fact that the ordinary relations which prevail between the stock-
holders of the public issue corporation and the corporation do not
apply, in important respects, in the case of these joint venture corpo-
rations. The objectives which usually lie behind the business de-
cision to utilize the joint venture corporation cannot be realized un-
less some deviation from the ordinary legal relations which obtain be-
tween stockholders and corporate management is allowed. This means
that the courts should continue to move away from the philosophy
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of Jackson v. Hooper, dominated as it is by some supposed duty to give
effect to the literal terms of general corporation statutes even though
this involves the violation of freely made contractual agreements and
deters effective business use of a very necessary form of organization.
Instead, the courts should renounce such formalism and recognize
not only that justice among the participants in a joint venture corpo-
ration will often be best achieved if the participants are required to
abide their freely negotiated agreements, but also that American in-
dustry will be the beneficiary of a more liberal judicial reception of
such agreements.
Most of the provisions and agreements employed by joint venture
corporations in American industry, although at variance somewhat
with the usual corporate forms, would be upheld as valid in many
jurisdictions even if a public issue. rather than a close corporation
were involved. This is true for example of provisions vesting control
in stockholders over election and retention of certain officers and em-
ployee. 64 However, the provisions and agreements for arbitration
of unsettled policy matters and other modifications of control by
the board of directors are more doubtful. In this category is the
"Dixon-Yates" provision for stockholders' approval of all contracts
for sale of power and the Iranian Oil Co. provision that any resolution
submitted to the board of directors may instead be submitted to a
general meeting of the stockholders. Such limitations on directorate
control of ordinary corporate affairs would be of doubtful validity in
a public issue corporation.65 Similarly, provisions for greater than
majority vote for stockholder action unless authorized by statute,
have been held invalid.66
Generally, these joint venture agreements are entered into by all
participants in the joint venture corporation. Various theories have
been employed to sustain these agreements. Some courts base their de-
cision on the theory that the corporation is the agency for carrying out
the agreement in question.67 Other courts have employed the theory
that the corporation is a trustee of the respective interest of the
parties.68 On the other hand, some courts have not leaned on the
crutches of the agency or trust theories in writing their opinion but
have stated flatly that the agreement is a binding, valid contract
64. 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPOATIONS § 2064 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952);
Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
65. 5 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 64, § 2097. It should be noted that some
statutes expressly authorize consent of stockholders to directors' action in
extraordinary corporate affairs, such as the sale or mortgage of the property
of a corporation. Id. § 2105.
66. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945); Hornstein,
supra note 15, at 443, 445.
67. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918);
Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925).
68. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Des Moines Union Ry., 254 U.S. 196 (1920);
Hunt v. Davis, 135 Cal. 31, 66 Pac. 957 (1901).
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which is not superseded or attenuated by the formal requirements
of corporate statutes. This type of forthright reasoning is particularly
applicable to agreements involving less than all of the stockholders
such as the one in Abercrombie v. Davies.6 9 But the important thing
is that the courts should recognize that close corporations engaging
in joint ventures are necessarily different in structure from public
issue corporations. Accordingly, where no injury to third parties is
involved, the strict rules of corporation law designed primarily for
the public issue corporation should not be applied woodenly to such
joint venture corporations. To give automatic obeisance to the rigid
requirements of the corporate form in this area of the law is to render
a disservice both to equity jurisprudence and to modern American in-
dustrial and business operations.
69. Agreements entered into by less than all the stockholders have been
sustained in a number of cases. Thompson v. Thompson Carnation Co., 279
Ill. 54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917); Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870); Hart v. Bell, 222
Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375, aff'd, 24 N.W.2d 41 (1946); Buck Retail Stores v.
Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954). Contra, Teich v. Kaufman, 174
Ill. App. 306 (1912); Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937);
Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309 (1882); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501(1876); Snow v. Church, 13 App. Div. 108, 42 N.Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dep't
1897); Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 Atl. 369 (1930).
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